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7 Ukraine
A constitutional design between façade 
democracy and effective 
transformation?
Oleksandr Serdiuk and Roman Petrov
Introduction: democratization in Ukraine in 2004–2009
The process of the democratization of the Ukrainian society started after gaining 
independence in 1991.1 Since then Ukraine has made significant progress 
towards achieving Western standards of democracy and civil society (see Table 
7.1). Before 2004 the state of political development in Ukraine could be con-
sidered a ‘hybrid democracy’ with strong presidential power. Therefore the 
period of 1991–2004 bears a label of ‘kuchmism’, which emphasizes the strong 
influence of former President L. Kuchma (in power from 1996–2004) on polit-
ical and economic life in Ukraine during that period.
Table 7.1 Major constitutional, legal and institutional reforms in Ukraine (1990–2010)
1990 Adoption of Law of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic ‘On 
Local Councils of People’s Deputies of Ukrainian SSR and Local 
Self-Government’
24 August 1991 Adoption of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine
1996 Joining of the Council of Europe
28 June 1996 Adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine
18 October 1996 Establishment of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine
23 December 1996 Adoption of Law of Ukraine ‘On Verkhovna Rada Commissioner 
on Human Rights (Ombudsman)’
2004 Launch by the EU of the European Neighbourhood Policy
18 March 2004 Adoption of Law of Ukraine ‘On All State Programme of 
Approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU Law’
8 December 2004 Signing constitutional amendments to resolve the ‘Orange 
Revolution’, move to the parliamentary republic
21 February 2005 Signing of the EU–Ukraine Action Plan
26 March 2006 Election of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
2 April 2007 President V. Yuschenko dissolves the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine
30 September 2007 Election of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
8 October 2008 President V. Yuschenko dissolves the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine
17 January 2010 Election of the president of Ukraine
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 The ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004–2005 has drastically changed the political 
environment in Ukraine. The dramatic victory of Victor Yuschenko in the presi-
dential campaign in 2005 brought many hopes for an immediate transformation 
of the hybrid regime to a regime of consolidated democratic in Ukraine. 
However, contrary to the other post- socialist countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe which have become full EU member states, Ukraine has not been able to 
acquire sufficient internal conditions (traditions of representative democracy, 
private property, the rule of law, etc.) to ensure the success of democratic trans-
formations and, consequently, to establish a consolidated type of democracy.
 In the second half of 2004, when the presidential election campaign started, 
Ukraine entered into a permanent political crisis. Eventually this crisis has grown 
into a crisis of political elites and finally into a crisis of the entire political 
system in Ukraine. This situation reveals the lack of effective instruments of for-
mation, institutionalization and coordination of political elites’ interests in 
Ukraine as well as lack of parliamentary and democratic traditions among the 
Ukrainian political elite.
 The political crisis in Ukraine was caused by several closely inter- related 
internal factors: (a) confrontation between two political powers having a very 
different understanding of internal and external priorities (one is the ‘pro- 
Western democratic force’ represented by the pro- presidential party ‘Our 
Ukraine’ and the ‘Block of Julia Timoshenko’ which, however, did not manage 
to acquire solid institutional bases of unity and mechanisms of cooperation: the 
other is the ‘pro- Russian’ ‘Party of Regions’ with considerable financial support 
from top Ukrainian oligarchs). These powers emphasized a growing split 
between the national political elites based on regional differences in Ukraine. (b) 
Institutional crisis of the Ukrainian political system and weak electoral and inter-
 institutional accountability, which is a direct consequence of hurried and there-
fore immature ‘constitutional reform’ initiated in December 2004.
 The forthcoming presidential elections in 2010 help to explain the continuing 
saga of political conflicts in Ukraine. Political elites in Ukraine have entered into 
a struggle to get as many advantages as possible before the elections in 2010. 
Another factor explaining recent political instability in Ukraine is the fact that 
the existing political system (parliamentary–presidential) was conceived as a 
temporary one as a response to the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004. Hitherto the 
model of ‘hybrid democracy’ has not exhausted itself in Ukraine. All leading 
principal political actors have a clear incentive to return to a consolidation of the 
political regime on the basis of hegemony of the parliamentary–presidential 
system. At this point the model of ‘hybrid democracy’ suits major political 
players in Ukraine since it helps them in their fierce struggle for political power.
 The result of an assessment of the current situation of democratic freedoms in 
Ukraine is ambiguous. Foreign political analysts and journalists often speak 
about existence of a right to freedom of speech, the absence of censorship and 
limitations on journalists and mass media in Ukraine. At this point they make 
reference to popular ‘political TV shows’, where representatives of different 
political parties carry out free discussion on most hot issues of political life in 
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Ukraine. However, in reality such shows represent certain political ideology that 
is oriented towards the redistribution of power (first by means of pre- term elec-
tions, then by means of formatting and reformatting the coalitions, and then by 
means of presidential elections). This phenomenon can be called ‘façade demo-
cracy’ or ‘political carnival’ where all the roles are clearly determined, and there 
are no vacant places within the audience.
 Current political crisis in Ukraine cannot be explained only by reference to 
internal factors. There are some external factors that have contributed to the 
political turmoil in Ukraine. For instance, one should also take into account 
the existence of the pro- European and pro- Russian strategies of Ukrainian 
political elites. The period of 2005–2008 was marked by growth of ‘Euroscep-
ticism’ in Ukraine. Surveys of the Ukrainian population reflect the gradual 
decrease in support for a pro- European orientation. Even within the pro- 
Western circles of the political elite in Ukraine which disliked the constrained 
(even somewhat cold) reaction of the European Union (EU) and Council of 
Europe (CoE) to the ‘European initiatives’ of the ‘Orange government’ there 
was growing concern that the EU and CoE had left Ukraine all alone with 
Russia. To support this opinion Russia has been increasing its influence on 
Ukraine using, first of all, the ‘gas factor’, forcing the political and business 
elites to doubt the necessity of a pro- European orientation, which means the 
loss of ‘cheap energetic resources from Russia’. The integrated nature of busi-
ness elites and political elites has caused economical pragmatism to dominate 
over democratic political and ideological values in Ukraine. Therefore the idea 
of the ‘Euroasian identity’ of Ukraine, which acknowledges the dominant geo-
political position of Russia, is gradually replacing the concept of ‘European 
identity’ in Ukraine.
 Since 2004 Ukraine has been actively promoting its European aspirations. An 
institutional mechanism for approximating national legislation to the acquis 
communautaire was created. However in a time of sharp political confrontation 
(not only against the opposition, but also inside the ruling coalition), the ‘Euro-
centrism’ of the Ukrainian political elite was taking shape. Despite the fact that 
Ukraine achieved some degree of success in approximating national legislation 
with the EU acquis it became further removed from the efficient enforcement of 
universally recognized democratic priniciples. The first concern was the so- 
called ‘constitutional reform’, which introduced the model of parliamentary 
republic in Ukraine in 2006.
 External factors instigated further experiments on the improvement of the 
political system in Ukraine. For international and European actors (EU, CoE, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)) the ‘come back’ 
of ‘kuchmism’ and the strengthening of authoritarianism was real. That is why 
major international actors supported the dialogue with Ukraine and constitutional 
reforms to establish a parliamentary republic in Ukraine. However the final 
result was unexpected. In the end Ukraine did not start to approach the standards 
of European democracy, but only got further from them. The gap between polit-
ical elites and the general population was growing, and political apathy and dis-
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appointment among political elites and the population was increasing. The scope 
of corruption reached surprisingly high levels, far beyond what happened in the 
period of ‘kuchmism’. As a result the Russian model of ‘ruled democracy’ 
became a more and more attractive option for Ukrainian electorates.
 Thus it can be stated that the current political crisis has sharpened the issue of 
the quality of democracy in Ukraine, placing doubt over not only the effective-
ness of political institutions and procedures, but also any consequent internaliza-
tion of democratic standards. Since the early independence, the development of 
democracy in Ukraine has been influenced by major international and European 
actors (mainly the EU and CoE). Ukraine was looking at European democracy 
standards for guidance. Below we shall endeavour to analyse the pace of the 
‘Europeanization’ of the Ukrainian political system and the influence of interna-
tional and European actors on this process.
Evolution of constitutionalism in Ukraine
Common European constitutional traditions and Ukrainian 
constitutionalism
The Ukrainian Constitution was born as a result of the prolonged constitutional 
process, which started in the period of the Ukrainian early independence in 
1990–1991. The evolution of constitutionalism in Ukraine was distinguished by 
sharp political confrontations and different ideological orientations existing in 
Ukrainian society at the time, and these found their way into a large number of 
the drafts of the Ukrainian Constitution. The choice for decision makers was 
rather simple: ‘either to follow the way of creation of a Ukrainian model of 
democratic social system (applied to countries of Eastern and Central Europe), 
or to follow the way of liberalization and authoritarianism’.2
 Ukrainian scholars frequently emphasize the existence of early domestic 
constitutional traditions. It has become customary to mention the Philip 
Orlyk’s Constitution – the first written constitutional draft prepared in the 
eighteenth century. It reflected the general picture of best constitutional ideas 
and principles in Europe at that time. In the end of the nineteenth and begin-
ning of the twentieth century representatives of the Ukrainian intellectual elite 
were influenced by the contours of modern European constitutionalism as the 
‘community of European traditions’. However, this influence was not sufficient 
to accelerate political and democratic reforms in Ukraine. The Soviet Ukrain-
ian Constitution of 1978 was a combination of declarative (fictive) freedoms 
and other elements of the authoritarian political regime of the ‘ruling commu-
nist party’. The illusion that democratic traditions existed in the Soviet Ukraine 
is quite widespread in the political culture of modern Ukraine. Furthermore, 
this illusion was quite influential during the process of creating the new Con-
stitution in 1996.
 One can underline the following sources that inspired the Ukrainian Constitu-
tion 1996:
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a romantic perceptions that it was possible to preserve certain elements of the 
Soviet constitutional system (such as the administrative and territorial 
system, system of local self- government on the basis of Councils, inclusion 
of social and economic rights etc.), and a distrust towards the market 
economy society, which resulted in the preservation of social rights (right to 
labour, right to sufficient level of life, right to accommodation etc.);
b examples of constitutional reforms in Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, etc.);
c constitutional ideas and provisions of ‘old European democracies’ (for 
example, the European Commission stated that the semi- presidential system 
of power to be implemented in Ukraine was in line with the French model, 
and the idea of the ‘social state’ was borrowed from the German 
Constitution);
d values and specific positions of the basic CoE conventions, and also other 
international legal documents.
These sources, combined with the controversial objectives of opposing political 
elites, caused the eclectic and inconsistent nature of the Ukrainian Constitution 
1996.
 Most inconsistencies in the Ukrainian Constitution 1996 were caused by the 
system of distribution of powers. For the supporters of the ‘renovated social-
ism’ model, the president was supposed to become an instrument of preserva-
tion of the socialist social model. Thus, in this respect, the political regime 
looked like a compromise. However, this model was rather inconsistent. Actu-
ally, the president of Ukraine was the head of executive power. However, the 
Ukrainian Constitution 1996 itself did not confirm this status. The provision 
that the president of Ukraine is a guarantor of the Constitution and the head of 
executive power was rather unclear, taking into account the provision that the 
supreme institution within the executive is the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. 
Like in other European post- socialist countries, one could observe a certain 
dualism in the organization of executive power, which created the preconditions 
for or the necessity even of an eventual transformation towards a parliamentary 
republic.
 Reports of the sessions of the Constitutional Commission Working Groups 
(the body created by the parliament of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada) in order to 
prepare the draft Constitution) in the course of 1992–1996 gives one a good 
picture of how European constitutionalism really influenced the nature of consti-
tutional reform in Ukraine.3 These documents demonstrate the complicated 
nature of this influence, which occurred in two ways:
a the inclusion of European ideas in the context of national discussions con-
cerning the draft 1996 Constitution, in the framework of the activity of the 
Constitutional Commission;
b the editing and monitoring of the constitutional process by the Venice Com-
mission, which prepared several conclusions as to the Constitution drafts.4
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Drafters of the Ukrainian Constitution 1996 were guided by two opposite 
motives. On the one hand, they were convinced that it was necessary to use the 
best European examples – including direct borrowing of provisions from the Con-
stitutions of the ‘old democracies’. The thesis of the ‘European identity’ of 
Ukraine evoked a substantive political and academic discussion, but did not 
provide any alternative models to the borrowing one. On the other hand, change 
agents in Ukraine were convinced that ‘not only the Western part of Europe is the 
creator of the modern European constitutionalism’, and this implied the possibil-
ity of drafting a constitutional text which would not correspond to the best Euro-
pean traditions. It is important to mention that the issue of Ukraine’s membership 
in the CoE was not raised at all in the course of the activity of the Commission.
 Monitoring reports of the Venice Commission became the only clearly deter-
mined legal and political instruments of influence in relation to the best Euro-
pean traditions and practices on the constitutional process in Ukraine.5 The 
attitude of some representatives of the Ukrainian political elites towards the con-
clusions of the Venice Commission was quite restrained at that time. When the 
draft Ukrainian Constitution was discussed at the sessions of the Constitutional 
Commission, one would quite often hear that ‘these are just Western experts, 
and we may not take their opinion into account’.6 In general, the Venice Com-
mission has considerably influenced the improvement of certain provisions in 
the Ukrainian Constitution concerning the organization and realization of the 
principle of distribution of power, formation of the Verkhovna Rada and its 
structures, organization of judicial system, the Constitutional Court, protection 
of human rights, status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and some other 
provisions. In its conclusions, the Venice Commission gave quite a satisfactory 
assessment of the Ukrainian Constitution as a ‘contribution to the democratic 
culture of Europe’. Besides this, it also pointed out some problematic aspects. 
Among them, one should mention several factors, which influenced the nature of 
the Ukrainian Constitution:
1 it has been typical for post- socialist countries to attempt to provide an 
‘extremely complete list of rights’ in the text of the Constitution without 
taking into account realities of their implementation and their judicial protec-
tion (first of all, social and economic rights), and there is also a vagueness 
about some human rights (for example, a lack of clarity in the prohibition of 
the death penalty, the possibility of limiting freedom of movement by an usual 
law and the absence of limitations for certain social rights etc.);
2 the unclear definition of competences of the Verkhovna Rada, the president 
and the Cabinet of Ministers with regard to the adoption of obligatory legal 
acts in Ukraine;
3 the ungrounded granting of the right of the legislative initiative to the pres-
ident and the National Bank (taking into account that the Cabinet of Minis-
ters has this right);
4 the strong dependence of the Cabinet of Ministers on the president when it 
is accountable to the Verkhovna Rada;
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5 a lack of understanding of the necessity to simplify administrative and terri-
torial divisions inherited from the Soviet Union;
6 contradictions and inconsistency in the determination of the legal status of 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea;
7 unclear procedures and mechanisms for the functioning of local self- 
government functioning.7
Constitutional reform in Ukraine: idea and consequences
The adoption of the new Ukrainian Constitution in 1996 coincided with the acti-
vation of dialogue between Ukraine and the CoE and the EU. It happened when 
Ukraine was declaring its intention to become a full EU member as a democratic 
country with a ‘European identity’. There was a big temptation at that time to 
justify the idea of reforming the Constitution of Ukraine by encouraging polit-
ical elites in Ukraine to react to recommendations of European institutions con-
cerning an optimal parliamentary model for Ukraine. However, the idea of a 
parliamentary republic in Ukraine found growing support due to the attempts by 
President Kuchma to strengthen his own presidential powers. In 1999–2004, the 
European institutions (EU, CoE, OSCE) were included in the process of amend-
ing the Ukrainian Constitution of 1996. The Venice Commission drafted conclu-
sions warning about possible risks that may appear during the realization of the 
procedurally unprepared reform of the Ukrainian Constitution.
 Generally, the European factor played quite an important role in the constitu-
tional process in Ukraine. However, it was the motivation of the main political 
elites that was crucial, which were guided exclusively by the logic of the fight 
for power. Ironically on the eve of elections of 2004 the slogan of reforming of 
the political system was taken up by the government of President Kuchma. 
Although used to claiming that a parliamentary republic would be harmful for 
Ukraine, President Kuchma made an about- turn and openly supported the parlia-
mentary republic model for Ukraine.
 The constitutional reform of Ukraine took final shape in December 2004 (cor-
responding changes to the Ukrainian Constitution of 1996 took effect starting 
from 1 January 2006) as the result of political compromise, which made it pos-
sible to hold a repeated second round of presidential elections and to resolve the 
conflict peacefully. All the institutional drawbacks of the new model resulted in 
a deep political crisis.
 Constitutional changes shifted the balance of powers in the mixed system of 
administration in favour of the Verkhovna Rada. The first issue concerns the for-
mation of the Cabinet of Ministers and control over its activity. However, the 
problems were created not by the new balance of powers, but rather by imperfect 
procedures, which had a critical role in the realization of this balance. The parlia-
mentary majority was given significant powers by the constitutional reform of 
2004. The Ukrainian Constitution, backed by the slogan of enhancing the polit-
ical responsibility of parliamentary forces, granted huge authority to the coali-
tion of parliamentary fractions, however the main procedures for their activities 
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were not regulated (formation, legitimating processes, dissolution, admittance 
and expelling of members, rights of separate deputies and the fractions’ leader-
ship). Simultaneously, it was not the position of the ‘coalition’ that was of 
crucial importance (the members of which were often just supernumerary 
persons), but rather the position of the key persons in the political elite, which 
maximized the approximation of the decision- making procedure to the oligarchic 
model.
 The introduction of a proportional electoral system with closed party lists 
became an important element of the constitutional reform of 2004 negatively 
influenced electoral rights. The practice of forming electoral lists of people who 
were not in fact a part of party life resulted in numerous examples of personal 
doctors, drivers and bodyguards of representatives of political elites being 
included on the party list. An image appeared in the mass consciousness of the 
Verkhovna Rada as being the ‘club of millionaires and their servants’.
 Ukrainian political parties do not correspond to political parties in ‘old demo-
cracies’. This is because in Ukraine powerful financial and industrial clans use 
political institutions for the creation of corresponding conditions in order to 
achieve their corporate interests. The ‘supremacy of right’ rhetoric has become 
an attribute of political leaders of the majority of parties. Certain authors admit 
that the use of the rhetoric of democratic values is a step towards the perception 
of these values. However, one can only partly agree with this. A part of the 
domestic political elites perceives the supremacy of right as the supremacy of 
law, and they use any formalities of the law for tactical purposes, cynically 
neglecting fundamental values – the realization of such values being the purpose 
for which these formalities were created.
 The kernel of constitutional reform in 2004 can be summarized in the follow-
ing way. It upset the division of power between the legislative and executive, 
and created a number of mixed constitutional arrangements:
1 a semi- legitimate situation for the coalition of parliamentary fractions in the 
Verkhovna Rada, the activity of which remained unregulated by legislation;
2 the separation of the functions of the head of the state from the executive;
3 two fractions within the Cabinet of Ministers, without providing the mech-
anisms for their interaction with the decision- making centres.
The consequence of the functioning of this political system has unavoidably led 
to political crises without any clear procedure of their resolution, the accumula-
tion of extra- constitutional mechanisms and relations, and the deepening of the 
estrangement of the people from the power. The constitutional reform in 2004 
led to a deterioration of the state of inter- institutional and electoral accountabil-
ity in Ukraine. Coalitions of fragile parliamentary fractions formed governments 
which were not able to represent a unified political will of political elites in 
Ukraine. On many occasions, the judiciary in Ukraine was used by particular 
political forces for their own benefit. As a result the legislature, executive and 
judiciary were not able to monitor each other and ensure the correct functioning 
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of checks and balances between them. On the eve of presidential elections in 
2010 leading political parties actively promote ideas of new constitutional 
reforms with diverging objectives (either presidential or parliamentary 
republics).
Relations between executive and legislative powers in 
Ukraine
A contemporary model of relations between legislative and executive power in 
Ukraine has resulted from political compromise during the ‘constitutional 
reform’ of 2004–2006. These changes were supposed to enhance not only the 
effectiveness of power, but also society’s control over it on the basis of being 
able to clearly identify the subjects and form of power structures and also by 
placing on them the responsibility for the results of the activities of these struc-
tures. It was supposed that an important result of the reform would be the forma-
tion of close electoral and inter- institutional accountability between the will of 
citizens during the elections and the processes of the formation of executive 
power. However, in reality these purposes were never achieved.
 The constitutional compromise was born in December 2004 with the direct 
involvement of the EU (EU High Representative H. Solana took a very active 
part in mediating the political crisis in Ukraine) on the eve of the unpredictable 
political confrontation (the ‘Orange Revolution’). Unfortunately the EU did not 
directly influence the content of the constitutional compromise at that time due 
to the priority given to the objective of preventing political and social unrest in 
Ukraine.
 Changes in the balance of power in 2006 shifted the authority in favour of the 
Verkhovna Rada. For instance, the president of Ukraine has lost most of his 
powers to appoint members of the executive while the Verkhovna Rada strength-
ened the guarantees of independence in legislative activity and (most crucially) 
acquired full authority as to the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers. The pres-
ident of Ukraine still has some important constitutional powers which, however, 
cannot be realized without the involvement of the executive power. They are the 
guarantee of sovereignty and territorial unity of the country, the guarantee of cit-
izens’ rights and freedoms and the administration of foreign policies and rela-
tions. As a result, the more or less functioning system of a presidential republic 
was replaced by another system, which has been more unclear and inconsistent 
in its realization.
 The most drastic changes occurred with regard to the Cabinet of Ministers, 
which turned from a body subordinated to the president into an autonomous 
body with significant authority limited only by a parliamentary control. The pos-
sibility of presidential control still remains, but it has a principally different 
nature now: the right to veto the legislative initiatives of the government and 
cessation of the effects of acts of the Cabinet of Ministers. In 2008–2009 where 
there was a split inside the ‘democratic coalition’ and sharpening of the personal 
confrontation between Yushenko and Tymoshenko, the institutional contradic-
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tions of these two elements of executive power (president and prime minister) 
became the reason for sharp political conflicts, the resolution of which became 
impossible in the existing legal field.
 The Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which could, at least theoretically, have 
become an arbitrator among branches of power in Ukraine, was limited to the 
consideration of disputes grounded on issues of constitutionality only, and it had 
to comply with a rather complicated formal procedure. In fact, the president of 
Ukraine allowed himself not only unconstitutional involvement in the authorities 
of Cabinet of Ministers in that period, but also he used institutions such as the 
Council of National Security and Defence and the Constitutional Court in polit-
ical strategies aimed at discrediting the government.
 However, reform could not create an effective system of inter- institutional 
accountability in Ukraine because numerous procedures were not regulated and 
not fixed either in the Constitution itself or in laws supporting its provisions.
 The new Constitution of Ukraine granted considerable powers to the so- called 
‘coalition of parliamentary fractions’, however it did not provide the main mech-
anisms for its formation, legitimating processes, dissolution, the admittance and 
expelling of members, rights of separate deputies and the fractions’ leadership 
(with the exception of time limits of declaration and submission of the candidate 
for the prime minister of Ukraine). The fact of how the parliamentary majority 
should function after the government is formed is not mentioned at all. In the 
years 2007 and 2008 ideas were more than once declared that ‘broad’ or ‘mega’ 
coalitions uniting all the parliamentary fractions should be created, i.e. that the 
coalition should be replaced with situational units of political forces. Such decla-
rations were evidence of a lack of any readiness amongst the political elites to 
work within the framework of the institutional model of power created by the 
constitutional reform. Thus, constitutional changes have led to a situation where 
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine lacks any kind of transparent procedure in rela-
tion to its formation and functioning. However, this very institution was granted 
key authorities in the field of state policy – not the least of which is the right to 
form the government.
 Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine in 2005 contained many contra-
dictions concerning functioning of the Cabinet of Ministers. For instance, a 
majority of ministers could be appointed by the ruling coalition of the parlia-
mentary fractions and a minority of ministers could be appointed by the presid-
ent of Ukraine. Although the original intention of this system was to create a 
balance of power between the legislature and the president, it led to constant 
internal political conflicts in Ukraine. It could be argued that the constitutional 
reform in 2004–2006 engendered two centres of executive power in Ukraine – 
one is the president another is the prime minister. At the same time it did not 
provide any efficient cooperation between them because this system was under-
pinned by another destabilizing factor – the dependence of government activity 
on the parliamentary coalition.
 The rationale behind current rules on appointment and functioning of the 
Cabinet of Ministers is also arguable. Currently, the government is formed on 
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situational grounds. To form the government of Ukraine the following is 
required: (a) the nomination of a prime minister by the coalition of parliament-
ary fractions in the Verkhovna Rada to the president of Ukraine; (b) approval of 
the nomination by the Verkhovna Rada with a simple majority of votes. At this 
point it is unknown what should be done if there are alternative nominations or 
if the president does not nominate a candidate for the Verkhovna Rada’s 
consideration.
 The parliamentary Coalition can be created upon the official nomination of 
the prime minister. In fact, the Cabinet of Ministers can start functioning as an 
independent body from this moment because in order to vote for its personal 
composition it is necessary to gain 226 out of 450 votes in the Verkhovna Rada. 
Moreover the parliamentary majority can be formed by using methods like 
bribery, blackmail, deceit and others. The competence of the president to dis-
semble the Verkhovna Rada is limited only by formal procedural methods: the 
observance of terms of formation of the Coalition and the Cabinet of Ministers, 
and the regular carrying out of plenary sessions. The Ukrainian Constitution 
leaves open issues typically encountered by governments of parliamentary 
republics, such as government dismissal in the case of the collapse of the coali-
tion, which means that regulation remains, once again, up to specific corporate 
interests. In practice the Ukrainian case makes the flow of parliamentary votes 
so elusive that nobody, except for experts, would notice the collapse and even 
the creation of a new coalition (informal majority). Endless ‘reformatting’ of the 
majority, so typical of Ukrainian parliamentarism, differs significantly from the 
classic forms of Western democracies. Therefore a weak prime minister in 
Ukraine totally depends on the will of political and business elites, represented 
by party fractions in the Verkhovna Rada.
 The model of executive power in Ukraine as it was established by the consti-
tutional reform of 2004–2006 has provided quite a high level of formal effec-
tiveness in the field of law drafting. The analysis of the situation of 2006 through 
to the beginning of 2007 demonstrates that the majority of the legislative drafts 
of the Cabinet of Ministers were adopted by the Verkhovna Rada. Almost 90 per 
cent of draft laws were adopted, contrary to the negative standing of the presid-
ent and opposition, which were mostly blocked by the parliament majority. The 
only instrument of counteraction was the right to veto; however, the Verkhovna 
Rada used all means to overcome it.
 The government of Ukraine had considerable success in harmonizing national 
legislation with the EU acquis communautaire. Quite an enhanced institutional 
model for assessing national legislation for its correspondence to the acquis 
communautaire was set up in Ukraine. There are quite striking statistics of the 
number of translations of EU acts and the number of drafts of legal acts (both 
laws and acts of Cabinet of Ministers and ministries) that were assessed, and the 
number of civil servants who were trained in EU law. However, in reality this 
looks rather like a ‘Potyomkin’s village’ of ‘Europeanization’.8 The romantic 
objective of the ‘Europeanization’ in Ukraine acquired rather bureaucratic and 
formal features. This is because the criteria of harmonization are reduced to a 
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simple textual correspondence of national legislation to EU acts. It is remarkable 
that almost 10 per cent of drafts submitted by the government for the approval by 
the Verkhovna Rada took into account the relevant provisions of EU acquis, and 
absolutely all law drafts were for compliance with EU law. The impact of Euro-
pean institutions on relations between the executive and legislature in Ukraine 
was limited due to never- ending political confrontations between these two 
branches of power. For instance, all presidential legislative initiatives to improve 
anticorruption legislation in line with standards of the CoE got the Verkhovna 
Rada’s approval only as a result of a ‘political quid pro quo’ between the presid-
ent and opposition on the one hand and the government and ruling coalition on 
the other. Later on, adoption of these drafts was blocked. It has become a general 
practice to ignore conclusions of European experts concerning legislative drafts.
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine
The establishment of the constitutional judiciary was a great novelty for Ukraine. 
In the opinion of the Venice Commission, the design of the Constitutional Court 
in Ukraine was greatly influenced by practices of post- socialist countries of 
Eastern and Central Europe, which were striving to have principally new courts 
which would be independent and which would safeguard newly acquired demo-
cratic values. In 1992 the first law on the Constitutional Court was adopted in 
Ukraine; however, the Constitutional Court was only set up in 1996.
 The institutional framework of the Constitutional Court represents a balance 
between legislative, executive and judicial powers. The organization of judicial 
power in Ukraine is determined by its strict division into courts of general juris-
diction and the Constitutional Court, which is the only body with constitutional 
jurisdiction in Ukraine. This model corresponds to the organization of judicial 
power in Germany and France. Ukrainian lawmakers consciously preferred the 
European concept of constitutional judiciary at the stage of determination, 
regardless of rather active attempts on the part of American experts to prove the 
effectiveness of the American unified judicial model.
 The model of authorities of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is based on 
four categories of cases that may be considered by the Constitutional Court:
1 constitutionality of laws, acts of the president and the Cabinet of Ministers 
and also the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea;
2 correspondence of international agreements and treaties in effect brought to 
the Verkhovna Rada for approval under the Constitution of Ukraine;
3 observance of procedure in the impeachment of the president;
4 official interpretation of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine.
The subjects with the right to make constitutional submissions on these issues are:
1 the president of Ukraine;
2 no fewer than 45 members of the Verkhovna Rada;
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3 the Supreme Court of Ukraine;
4 the Ombudsman;
5 the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
This model ensures that the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is an absolutely 
autonomous element in the judicial system and the only body with constitutional 
jurisdiction.
 In order to assess the role of the Constitutional Court, it is important to deter-
mine the accessibility of constitutional legislation for physical and legal persons, 
paying special attention to the limitations of jurisdiction and subjects of applica-
tion listed above. The procedure of ‘constitutional application’ in Ukraine gives 
a right of constitutional appeal to any physical and legal person in the following 
circumstances: (a) where provisions of the Constitution and laws are applied 
ambiguously by courts and public bodies and (b) such application infringes their 
rights. Analysis of the Constitutional Court’s practice demonstrates that the 
number of such applications was constantly decreasing, because the Constitu-
tional Court refused to initiate proceedings where it found there were no grounds 
for proceedings, taking into account the criteria listed above. Thus, this mechan-
ism did not prove to be effective.
 The main principle of the Constitutional Court’s formation is equal (six 
judges for each) and representation of the three branches of power via nomina-
tions by the president, the Verkhovna Rada and the Council of Judges. In times 
of deep political crisis in Ukraine the dualism of the executive power has 
emerged (with the president and prime minister as competing political institu-
tions). Consequently, doubt has been cast on the appropriateness of giving the 
right to appoint the judges of the Constitutional Court only to the president, 
because this does not correspond to the real balance of political elites and gives 
additional advantage to the president, which he can abuse for his own interests.
 Ukrainian legislation on the status and competences of the Constitutional 
Court was thoroughly monitored by the European institutions (the Venice Com-
mission, the EU). In general these recommendations were taken into account; 
however, certain drawbacks remained in place.9
 Risks contained in the procedures of constitutional judiciary became apparent 
when the term of office for some of the constitutional judges expired in 2005 and 
the necessity of their replacement arose. This situation coincided with the sharp-
ening of internal contradictions in Ukrainian political life in the context of dis-
cussions on the constitutional reform, when actually the function of the 
Constitutional Court as an independent arbitrator could be realized. However, 
instead of this, the activity of the Constitutional Court was blocked by political 
elites. Lack of regulation of the issue of judges’ replacement meant that the 
Verkhovna Rada and the president could not fulfil their duty to replace the 
judges according to their quota for a long time, which was a result of the fact 
that the necessary quorum could not be reached. The political crisis of 2007–
2008 demonstrated the fact that the constitutional reform had actually legiti-
mized the ‘party principle’ in the formation of the Constitutional Court, though 
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formally judges belong to no party. New candidates for replacement were 
selected exclusively by the party principle and quite soon (coinciding with the 
consideration of a case on the constitutionality of a presidential decree) the 
judges evidently demonstrated their party sympathies, with a clear division in 
the Constitutional Court between the ‘president’s’ and ‘prime minister’s’ wings. 
European institutions were worried by the situation of the Constitutional Court 
of Ukraine, and their position was clearly demonstrated in the conclusions of the 
Venice Commission. These related to possible constitutional and legislative 
changes in order to provide non- stop functioning of the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine, which contained not only the wording of the problem, but also sug-
gested specific mechanisms for resolving the issue.10 However, in the conditions 
of the political crisis, these recommendations were ignored and with perspective, 
it is not likely that they will be realized in the near future.
 An important factor of the Constitutional Court’s activity is the quality of 
judges. In the early period the majority of constitutional judges were judges of 
domestic courts whose legal consciousness and values were formed in the frame-
work of the Soviet judiciary and on the bases of legal positivism. In 2004–2006 
the majority of constitutional judges were replaced, and as a consequence of this, 
this peculiarity only increased. Besides this, the role of ‘judicial administrators’ 
also increased. For example, the ex- minister of justice who became a member of 
the Constitutional Court, was investigated during the crisis of 2007 by the Secur-
ity Service of Ukraine for being in receipt of bribes worth multimillions. It was 
very hard for constitutional judges to step away from the ‘ritual’ and declarative 
usage of the principle of ‘supremacy of law’ to the realization of its spirit and 
values. More than once it was declared in Ukraine that it is necessary to form the 
Constitutional Court on the basis of other principles, which would increase its 
creativeness and ensure the qualification of judges in line with the best Western 
democratic and constitutional values.
 During the period of 1997–2005 (before the ‘functioning standstill’ of the 
Constitutional Court began) the Constitutional Court of Ukraine adopted 73 
decisions as to the correspondence of Ukrainian legislative acts to the Constitu-
tion. In particular, around 200 legislative provisions were found unconstitutional. 
However, the enforcement of decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is 
far from being positive. In accordance with the Law of Ukraine ‘On [the] Con-
stitutional Court’, legal acts may be invalidated as soon as a relevant decision is 
issued by the Constitutional Court. During the first years of functioning of the 
Constitutional Court the Verkhovna Rada reacted expediently to these situations 
by making corresponding and timely changes in the legislation. However, from 
the end of 1990, the majority of decisions of the Constitutional Court have been 
either ignored or not enforced at all. For example, the decision of the Constitu-
tional Court of Ukraine of 2 November 2004 was not enforced for two years. 
Only at the end of 2006 were corresponding changes introduced to the Criminal 
Code of Ukraine. The low level of enforcement of decisions of the Constitutional 
Court is explained by the fact that judgments often do not contain clear guide-
lines regarding the method of enforcement.
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 The Constitutional Court of Ukraine can be regarded as the biggest recipient 
of international and European technical and expert assistance.11 Subsequently, it 
has proved to be an undisputed champion among other courts in Ukraine in 
referring to international law and universally recognized principles in its 
decisions. In most cases these references relate to rules of international law 
regarding the protection of constitutional rights and freedoms: freedom of asso-
ciation, right to participate in public management, right to vote and to be elected, 
respect for private life, right to social protection, right for free medical assistance 
in public hospitals, freedom of trade union activities, right to a fair trial and 
others. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine justified these references by the fact 
that the ratification by Ukraine of fundamental international and regional (Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, ECHR) conventions conferred rights on 
Ukrainian citizens, foreigners and stateless persons to refer to international 
means of protecting their rights in case they are not adequately protected by the 
judiciary in Ukraine.12 The Constitutional Court of Ukraine referred to various 
international legal sources in every third decision. In every second decision the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine endeavoured to interpret provisions of the Con-
stitution of Ukraine in line with best international and European legal 
standards.13
 Ukrainian constitutional judges are in favour of more frequent and effective 
references to international law, and to ECHR and EU law, in order to ensure 
more effective protection of the constitutional freedoms of Ukrainian nationals. 
Furthermore, some judges of the Constitutional Court advocate the necessity of 
applying in their decisions more elements of the EU acquis owing to Ukraine’s 
pro- European policies and its aspirations for EU membership.14
 In most decisions taken by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, EU law is 
applied as a persuasive source of reference. For instance in the course of com-
parative analysis the Constitutional Court referred to EC Regulation 2004/2003 
‘on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules 
regarding their funding’,15 along with international conventions, ECHR law and 
European Court of Human Rights case law in its ruling on the constitutionality 
of Ukrainian law entitled ‘On political parties in Ukraine’.16 Furthermore, the 
Constitution Court of Ukraine referred to EC Council Directive 2000/7817 in its 
ruling on the constitutionality of Ukrainian laws ‘On public service’, ‘Diplo-
matic service’ and ‘Local self governmental service’ (case on the maximum 
retirement age for civil servants).18
Decentralization and regionalism
Ukrainian model of local self- government and its implementation
Creation of the Ukrainian model of local self- government started before the 
independence of Ukraine in 1991. In 1990 the Law of Ukraine ‘On Local Coun-
cils of People’s Deputies of Ukrainian SSR and Local Self- Government’ was 
adopted, which ensured transformation of the existing system of local electoral 
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bodies into the bodies of actual local self- government. Formally, the majority of 
procedural and organizational features of the Soviet model of self- government 
remained unchanged, because of the illusion of a ‘possibility of socialism reno-
vation’ at that time. In particular, this provided making ‘non- public’ those coun-
cils which were not recognized belonging to state executive power in the 
framework of the division of powers into three branches. This resulted in the 
‘exclusion’ of local governments from executive power.
 Further on, the problem of local self- government progressed in the context of 
sharp ideological counteraction in Ukraine. This was reflected in the existence of 
two models for the formation of local self- government, which were not of an 
exclusively doctrinal nature and reached beyond the limits of simple theoretic 
discourse. The first model (community) was grounded in the fact that there were 
natural rights of territorial unities which are realized in the municipal (local) 
government independent from the state. The second model (state) considered 
that the basis of local self- government was the principle of decentralization of 
power, i.e. delegation of certain authorities by state to non- state subjects – terri-
torial communities and their elected bodies. Attitudes to these models may serve 
as an indicator of the influence of European traditions, because their kernel is 
the model of the decentralization of state power in line with the principle of 
 subsidiary. In Ukraine, it was recognized and fixed in corresponding Ukrainian 
legislation (the Constitution of Ukraine, Laws of Ukraine ‘On Local Self- 
Government’ and ‘On Local Public Administrations’) that local councils are 
deprived from fulfilling functions of state (except for cases when such functions 
are delegated to them in accordance with a special procedure) and should con-
centrate on resolving exclusively questions of ‘local importance’. This implied 
that in order to resolve issues of state importance locally, it is necessary to create 
corresponding local bodies of executive power, which would be included into 
the hierarchy of executive power headed by the president. An analysis of func-
tions of bodies of local self- government demonstrates that their separation is 
unclear, ungrounded and contradictory, and that inter- institutional accountability 
does not function properly. Actually, the majority of self- government authorities 
are bodies of executive power.
 Drawbacks of the model of local self- government in Ukraine are also con-
cerned with budgetary powers which are conditioned by general peculiarities of 
the budget system of Ukraine: limits on the income of local budgets (local coun-
cils), their dependence on the right to distribution of state donations among the 
territorial communities vested to district and regional administrations, absence of 
financing for the execution of the delegated authorities of state and calculation of 
local budgets on the level of minimal social needs (i.e. social guarantees of the 
state).
 When the model of local self- government was created, its similarity with the 
system of territorial organization of power was preserved, which was inherited 
from the Soviet system and grounded on three levels: basic (local councils in 
cities, towns and villages), district and regional. This differed significantly from 
the post- socialist countries of Europe, where the two- level structure dominated.
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 This model of self- government was created in Ukraine in the middle of the 
1990s and it was preserved practically unchanged until the constitutional 
changes in 1996. The main problem in the relations between the central and local 
power is the existence of the dual model of regional administration, which is 
reflected in the fact that there are two types of regional administrative structures 
at the regional level. On the one hand, there are local elected bodies (councils at 
the basic level and also district and regional councils), which are elected, though 
they do not have corresponding executive bodies. On the other hand, there also 
exists local public administrations, which belong to the hierarchy of executive 
power and are subordinated directly to the president of Ukraine. This dualism 
creates a double subordination of local bodies of public executive power: both to 
the central bodies of executive power and to local representative bodies (coun-
cils). The existence of an institution of delegated authorities is certainly an 
explanation of this dual subordination; however, on the whole this creates 
ungrounded competition between the president and the government. Constitu-
tional reform of 2004–2006 was supposed to separate the fields of influence of 
the president and the government within the executive power. In reality this did 
not happen because of the numerous procedural drawbacks of the new mechan-
ism of power. The president remained the key element in the process of forma-
tion and control over the activity of local public administrations. The fact that 
the president and head of the government belonged to different political forces 
actually split the system of administration of the local level. In 2006–2007 this 
was a typical situation in many regions of Ukraine whenever there was a conflict 
between local councils and heads of local public administrations. In 2008–2009 
institutional ineffectiveness of another kind was displayed in constant confronta-
tions between the president and prime minister, when the president used his right 
to replace the heads of local state administrations without complying with the 
procedure of coordinating such actions with the government.
 Traditional problems of local self- government were sharpened by the intro-
duction of a proportional electoral system at the level of local elections in the 
framework of ‘constitutional reform’ (except for the elections to village councils 
and village heads) in 2006. This situation implied an increased centralism in the 
governing of the regions (especially on the level of regions and districts as the 
actual key levels of self- government), because very often local centres of parties 
carried out the party’s policy not taking into account specific local interests. 
Some elected deputies of local councils did not even live in the regions where 
they were elected. The transfer of political centralization to the local level broke 
the balance of relations between the population and local political elites, thus 
creating the basis for conflict.
Europeanization and changes in the model of self- government
Discussions of the idea of reforming the system of local self- government started 
in Ukraine shortly after the Constitution 1996 was adopted, and most actively 
pursued in political conflict between the president and the ‘democratic coalition’ 
668_07_Democratization.indd   186 15/2/10   08:17:02
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Ukraine  187
in 2007–2009. The political opposition was standing for the transfer to a model 
of self- government that would provide real decentralization of the state adminis-
tration and better inter- institutional accountability. Actually this was similar to 
the position of the European institutions.
 One should mention three levels of influence of European standards on 
Ukrainian practice. The first one relates to the fact that Ukraine was included in 
the mechanisms of interaction, which were provided by the European Charter of 
Human Rights on local self- government and institutionalized on the basis of the 
CoE Congress of local and regional governments. Second, there is interaction 
between the EU and Ukraine, which in the present conditions is carried out in 
the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Third, there are bilateral 
relations between the local governments of Ukraine and the CoE (having differ-
ent status in relation to the EU). The peculiarities of each of the mechanisms are 
as follows:
1 Ukraine ratified the European Charter on local self- government (Charter) in 
1997 having agreed to regular monitoring on behalf of the European institu-
tions. In 1998–2001 an assessment of correspondence of Ukrainian legisla-
tion to the European model was held in the framework of the monitoring 
procedure of the CoE Congress of local and regional governments (Con-
gress), which was reflected in two Recommendations as to the situation of 
local and regional self- government (Recommendation 102 (2001) and Rec-
ommendation 48 (1998)). The Congress stated that ‘Ukrainian government, 
when ratifying the Charter, evidently underestimated its importance and 
influence on political life’ which was reflected in the ‘deficit of democracy 
and supremacy of law on the level of local governments’. The following 
drawbacks of the Ukrainian model of self- government were mentioned: 
absence of clear separation of local self- government from regional and state 
executive power, absence of appropriate financial provisions to local gov-
ernment, lack of regulation of the municipal property issue, contradicting 
local and delegated authorities etc. In general, it was stated that there is a 
real need for the implementation of the Charter into national practice. These 
recommendations were used for the preparation of drafts for the reform of 
local self- government, however they were never realized.
 The reform of local self- government has become one of the top issues of 
the political dialogue between Ukraine and the CoE. This problem became 
especially sharp during the crisis of 2004–2008. The Recommendation of 
CoE Parliamentary Assembly 1,722 (2005) ‘On Fulfillment of its Duties and 
Obligations by Ukraine’ underlined the necessity to intensify the program of 
collaboration with the purpose to assist the bodies of Ukrainian government 
to implement the Charter in order to increase the development of local 
democracy in Ukraine (regarding both the normative regulation and educa-
tion of local self- government servants).
2 The problem of local self- government in Ukraine was represented quite sig-
nificantly in the framework of the EU–Ukraine relations which set up 
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numerous EU programmes for financing educational and informational 
projects on sharing the experience of European countries with the ‘Ukrain-
ian municipal movement’. A specific direction of the collaboration was the 
trans- border cooperation. During 2004, the European Commission presented 
the programmes of small Europe Aid projects on frontier collaboration, 
which were mainly of an economical nature. After 2006, a number of 
‘neighbourhood programmes’ were initialized in the framework of Western 
European programmes INTERREG (interregional cooperation programme(s) 
funded by the European Union), which also aimed at the reduction of 
general tension on the frontier (fight against crime, illegal migration etc.). 
All these programmes were based on a pragmatic approach by the EU to the 
security of their own frontiers. They had only indirect influence on the proc-
esses of democratization and changes in the system of local self- government, 
especially taking into account the minor financing of these programmes.
3 In the Soviet period, local councils of cities and regions of Ukraine had 
close bilateral connections with the cities and regions of Eastern and Central 
Europe. These connections developed most actively with Poland, receiving 
financial assistance from the Polish government. Totally, now more than 
180 cities and towns and regions of Ukraine have constant bilateral connec-
tions with the EU member states. These connections have become an 
important channel for sharing the examples of realization of the European 
decentralization model.
Ombudsman
The office of Ombudsman is principally new for Ukraine because it never 
existed in the Soviet Union. This fact somehow explains a rather long period for 
its establishment in Ukraine. The issue of establishing the office of Ombudsman 
in Ukraine caused considerable political debate at the time of drafting the Con-
stitution of Ukraine before 1996. One part of the political elite believed that 
functions of the Ombudsman as to the protection of human rights could be per-
formed by the prosecutor’s office.19 The other part of the political elite whole-
heartedly supported the establishment of the office of Ombudsman (the 
Verkhovna Rada commissioner on human rights) as a compulsory institution 
inherent to democratic regimes. The fundamentals of the legal status of the 
Ombudsman are fixed in the Constitution of Ukraine and in the Law of Ukraine 
‘On Verkhovna Rada Commissioner on Human Rights’ (23 December 1996).
 According to the Ukrainian model the Ombudsman’s office is accountable to 
the Verkhovna Rada over the observance and protection of human rights in 
Ukraine. The main requirements of the Ombudsman’s office (besides the univer-
sal requirements as to public officials in the governmental bodies) are his/her 
independence, that he/she may belong to no political party and may not combine 
the functions of the office with other types of activity (except for education and 
research). The Ombudsman is elected by the Verkhovna Rada upon the proposal 
of the head of the Verkhovna Rada or no less than one- quarter of members of 
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the Verkhovna Rada. Since 1999, the Ombudsman has had a rather high status in 
the system of supreme public officials, equal to that of the head of the Constitu-
tional Court of Ukraine.
 The competences of the Ombudsman include the consideration of applica-
tions of individuals on human rights infringements (made no more than one year 
after the infringement), and also the applications of members of the Verkhovna 
Rada. The Ombudsman can also initiate proceedings on his/her own initiative. 
Simultaneous proceedings cannot be initiated regarding infringements that are 
being considered by other courts. The law contains a rather detailed regulation 
of proceedings for such cases granting significant authorities to the Ombudsman 
in his relations with state bodies. It is worth mentioning that the excessively 
declarative nature of these provisions and a lack of clear procedure for collabo-
ration between the Ombudsman and state bodies was reflected in the situation of 
negotiation with the Somali pirates who captured the Ukrainian ship Fayina in 
2008. According to the minister of foreign affairs, the actions of the Ombuds-
man represented harm rather ‘than favour [in] the negotiation process’.
 Results of constitutional proceedings (considerations of applications from 
individuals) show that the Ombudsman’s office usually either directs applica-
tions concerning the unconstitutional nature of legal acts to the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine or files a requirement to eliminate the infringement to the state 
bodies. The law provides that all infringements of human rights have to be elimi-
nated in the course of one month after a formal complaint of the Ombudsman’s 
office. However, neither the law on the Ombudsman, nor any other laws, contain 
provisions on responsibility for the non- fulfilment of Ombudsman’s applications 
and requirements, or methods of their fulfilment. This makes the Ombudsman’s 
complaints rather ineffective and declarative. There is no exhaustive information 
on the effectiveness of the Ombudsman’s complains in Ukraine. During the 
entire period of the Ombudsman’s office activity in Ukraine (1997–2009), 
almost 850,000 applications were submitted by Ukrainian nationals to it. 
According to the Ombudsman’s office reports 77,000 applications were received 
(among them 21,000 were written applications) in 2007.20 However the Ombuds-
man’s office made only 38 appeals to the corresponding bodies of state and local 
power, the majority of which concerned individual situations of human rights 
infringements, and, according to the estimations of Ukrainian human rights 
organizations, did not have strategic importance in eliminating systematic draw-
backs in legislation and its application in practice.
 The Ombudsman’s office is very often defined as a ‘decorative element’ in 
the system of human rights protection in Ukraine. This can be explained not only 
by the drawbacks of the institutional status of Ombudsman, but also by some 
subjective factors. During the political crisis of 2004–2007 the situation with the 
Ombudsman’s office became especially sharp when the Ombudsman issue 
ranked high in the political context. With two terms of service, the current 
ombudsman, Nina Karpachova, openly infringed the principle of independence 
and impartiality when she agreed to be included in the electoral list of the Party 
of Regions, and during spring to autumn 2006 she was also a member of the 
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Verkhovna Rada. Representatives of the democratic elite had doubted the ability 
of Ms Karpachova to share democratic values, taking into account her critical 
speeches in 1999–2002 concerning the ‘double standards of the Council of 
Europe’ – which was essentially her indirectly supporting President Kuchma’s 
regime. In January 2007 before the elections of the Ombudsman in Ukraine the 
CoE Parliamentary Assembly directed a letter to the head of the Verkhovna 
Rada on the impossibility of electing a person who is not politically neutral, as 
the Ombudsman. However, this letter was not taken into account, and the parlia-
mentary majority elected Ms Karpachova as a ‘possibility to gain control over 
another political institution’.21
 An analysis of the international activities of the Ombudsman’s office in 
Ukraine gives us no idea as to the existence of any connection between this insti-
tution and the real implementation of EU democratic standards in Ukraine. The 
Ombudsman’s office in Ukraine enjoys a developed system of European connec-
tions, and contacts with national ombudsmen are constant and manifold. The 
Ombudsman’s office is also active in the framework of the European ombuds-
man’s network, and takes part in the majority of its activities. However this is 
mostly formal, ‘ritual’ activity that does not considerably influence Ukrainian 
legislation and practice.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have undertaken two tasks. First, we have sought to present 
the state of democratic and institutional reforms in Ukraine since its independ-
ence in 1991. We have suggested that Ukraine has completed a successful trans-
formation from a communist regime to a ‘hybrid democracy’ model. High hopes 
were placed on the ‘Orange Revolution’ as a means of ensuring the further trans-
formation to a Western style democracy. However these hopes have not been 
fulfilled due to continuing political instability in Ukraine and the struggle 
between change agents and veto players. Second, we have reviewed institutional 
reforms in Ukraine in areas of executive, judiciary (Constitutional Court), local 
self- government, protection of human rights (Ombudsman). Our analysis shows 
that all these institutional frameworks have been considerably reformed and 
influenced by European institutions (EU, CoE, OSCE). However these changes 
did not contribute to overall institutional stability and inter- institutional account-
ability in Ukraine. Thus, an institutional focus enables us to link the issue of the 
‘Europeanization’ of Ukrainian consitutional and institutional structures with the 
effectiveness of international technical assistance to Ukraine. In many cases 
international and European financial and technical support focused on the adop-
tion and implementation of laws and standards, omitting the issues of effective 
functioning and judicial activism.
 Our overview shows that the Constitutional Court of Ukaine – in spite of 
remaining the most progressive branch of the judiciary in Ukraine – became 
paralysed by the political struggle of the political elites. The executive and leg-
islative are in a constant political struggle in the Verkhovna Rada, and the 
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functionality of the ruling coalition is questionable. The office of Ombudsman 
has not been able to maintain its credibility among political elites and the 
general population. Also it was not able to cope with the increasing flow of 
applications from Ukrainian nationals and has therefore been unable to effect-
ively protect their interests and rights before the government and other state 
institutions.
 We conclude with the suggestion that the process of ‘Europeanization’ has 
encountered many difficulties and challenges in Ukraine. However, this does not 
mean that the democratic transformation of Ukraine is doomed to fail. Reinvig-
oration of international and European efforts to ensure the ‘Europeanization’ of 
Ukrainian society through the promotion of European common values and their 
effective functioning would contribute to the strengthening of democracy and 
the rule of law in Ukraine.
 The state of inter- institutional accountability (within the domains of constitu-
tionalism, executive and legislative powers, decentralization and regionalism and 
the Ombudsman) should be considered as moderate. Political power struggles 
and focus on party interests have relegated the values of the constitutional reform 
in 2004–2006. Examples of the ‘Constitutional Court standstill’ in 2005–2006 
and the inability of the Ombusdman Nina Karpachova to stay neutral from active 
politics show that despite considerable legislative and constitution changes in the 
aftermath of the ‘Orange Revolution’ there was only very moderate improve-
ment in inter- institutional accountability in Ukraine.
 The EU has been actively involved in constitutional and institutional changes 
in Ukraine by providing regular monitoring and financial and technical assist-
ance to Ukraine. One of the most successful examples of the EU’s impact on 
branches of power in Ukraine is the judiciary. The EU offers considerable finan-
cial and technical assistance for the reform of the Ukrainian judiciary in line 
with EU best standards through the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instru-
ment. Only in the period 2007–2010 does Ukraine expect to obtain €494 million 
for the implementation of the EU–Ukraine Action Plan, including the strength-
ening of the independence and effectiveness of the Ukrainian judiciary. The EU 
funds projects to enhance the capacities of the Ukrainian judiciary and law 
enforcement bodies in international cooperation in criminal matters, and to set 
up a European Policy legal advice centre. The EU persistently encourages 
Ukraine to intensify cooperation with the CoE, OSCE and other international 
institutions in combating corruption (for instance, joining the CoE’s Group of 
States against Corruption).
 The EU’s attempts to reform the Ukrainian judiciary have achieved some 
degree of success. The Ukrainian court system now enjoys better transparency 
and information support (establishing administrative courts, the creation of an 
electronic database of all national court decisions). The Ukrainian judiciary and 
law enforcement institutions have entered into an active cooperation with EU 
agencies such as EuroJust and FRONTEX. However, these changes have not 
helped to change the reputation of the Ukrainian judiciary as one of the most 
corrupt institutions in the country. EU experts warn that the Ukrainian judiciary 
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faces serious problems in the quality and substance of the legal training of its 
judges, as well as their regular professional training and funding. As a result, 
judicial decisions in Ukraine do not always comply with rule of law standards, 
and are often based on arbitrariness.22
 Therefore it could be concluded that the EU’s attempts to reform and ‘Euro-
peanize’ political and state systems in Ukraine is not a success story. However, 
it could be a success in the long term. The EU’s means of influence via regular 
monitoring and offering technical and financial assistance have led to a degree of 
positive improvement but have not achieved all of its objectives. There could be 
several reasons for this. One reason is the very weak system of incentives for 
Ukrainian political elites that is offered by the EU. Until there is no prospect of 
full EU membership it would be wrong to expect any serious changes within the 
Ukrainian political system. Another reason is the constant political turbulence in 
Ukraine caused by the shift to the parliamentary republic system. It proved to be 
a key factor for instability in Ukraine. One cannot expect drastic improvements 
without first solving these problems in Ukraine.
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